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can be reviewed directly by the Court. While this approach is not in
accord with the original congressional desire to have federal decisions
invalidating state statutes reviewed expeditiously by the Court, a
restrictive interpretation seems justified in order to keep the Supreme
Court's docket within manageable proportions. The long-term solution
lies in revision of the statutory provisions governing three-judge courts.
NATURE OF SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION REQUIRED

FoR

THREE-JUDGE Dis'ntRIr COURT

Nieves v. Oswald
A suit brought in a federal court to enjoin the enforcement of a
state statute, administrative order, or regulation which is of state-wide
application, must be decided by a district court of three judges.' The
single district judge who receives such a complaint and motion for a
three-judge court must determine whether a substantial federal question exists thereby warranting the convocation of a three-judge district
court.2 The statutory scheme authorizing the three-judge district court,
and the accompanying provisions governing appellate review,3 have
been the source of endless jurisdictional headaches for both judges and
litigants. 4
128 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). Three-judge court legislation stems from a concern expressed
in the early part of this century that single-judge district courts had abused their power
to issue injunctions against state statutes, especially statutes regulating transportation and
industry. Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 476 (1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111,
116 (1965); Note, FederalJurisdiction - Three-Judge Courts - The Recent Evolution in
Jurisdictionand Appellate Review, 61 Mic. L. REv. 1528, 1529 (1963); Note, The ThreeJudge Federal Court in ConstitutionalLitigation: A ProceduralAnachronism, 27 U. CHI.
L. RaV. 555, 556 (1960). There was a feeling that federal judges had "run wild" in their
issuance of injunctions against state legislation. Note, The Three-Judge Court and Appellate Review, 49 U. VA. L. REv. 538,539 (1963).
The purpose of § 2281 is "to prevent a single federal judge from being able to
paralyze totally the operation of an entire regulatory scheme... by issuance of
a broad injunctive order"....
Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967), quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
154 (1962).
In providing for three-judge courts, Congress acted to protect and benefit the interests
of the states. Indeed, it was thought that parties attacking state enactments were overly
protected. Currie, The Three-Judge Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
1, 77 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Currie]; Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and
Procedure under Section 2281, 77 HARv. L. REv. 299, 300 (1963). See Astro Cinema Corp.
v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970).
2 Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1961);
Bistrick v. Univ. of S. C., 319 F. Supp. 193, 194 (D.S.C. 1970); Glancy v. Parole Bd. of the
Mich. Dep't of Corrections, 287 F. Supp. 34, 37 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Powell v. Workmen's
Compensation Bd. of N.Y., 214 F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.

1963).
a Either party can appeal directly to the Supreme Court from an order issued by a
three-judge district court granting or denying injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
4 One distinguished authority has said that:
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In Nieves v. Oswald5 the Second Circuit discussed the standards
which must be met in order to invoke the jurisdiction of a three-judge
district court and dealt with a novel situation-the attempted withdrawal of a request for an injunction in order to effectuate a review of
the merits by the court of appeals. There, the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded the decision of a single district court judge that the
plaintiffs' claims did not present a constitutional issue of sufficient
proportion to warrant the convening of a three-judge court.
The plaintiffs in Nieves, inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility, brought an action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 6
against the prison officials 7 of Attica alleging infringement of their
federal constitutional rights and seeking to enjoin the holding of
disciplinary hearings unless certain procedural safeguards were implemented. The complaint alleged that the procedures followed in prison
disciplinary proceedings were unconstitutional in that: (1) the plaintiffs "are denied the opportunity to present witnesses in their defense
and to confront adverse witnesses;" (2) "the rules governing prisoner
conduct are so vague as to be void;" (3) "the testimony is unsworn;"
(4) "inmates are not given Miranda-type warnings even though statements made in disciplinary proceedings may be used in subsequent
criminal prosecutions;" (5) "inmates are denied assistance of counsel;"
(6) there is "inadequate notice of the rule allegedly violated.., and of
the precise facts underlying the charges;" (7) they "are denied a decision by an unbiased decision-maker and are not accorded a written
opinion by the deciding tribunal based upon substantial evidence."8
Since the complaint in essence sought an injunction against the enforcement of state regulations which controlled disciplinary proceedings in all state correctional facilities, 9 the plaintiffs requested the
convocation of a three-judge district court.
The existing three-judge statutes are in a mess. No one really knows when three
judges are required.
Currie, supra note 1, at 78.
See Note, Federal Jurisdiction - Three-Judge Courts - The Recent Evolution in
Jurisdictionand Appellate Review, 61 MicH. L. REv. 1528, 1580 (1963); Note, The ThreeJudge FederalCourt in ConstitutionalLitigation:A ProceduralAnachronism, 27 U. Cm. L
REV. 555, 571 (1960).
5477 F.2d 1109 (1973). Judge Feinberg authored the majority opinion, with Judges
Mulligan and Timbers comprising the rest of the unanimous panel. In his opinion, Judge
Feinberg expressed his frustration with the three-judge court legislation and felt that
Nieves was further proof of the need to revise or repeal these provisions. Id. at 1110-11.
642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1972).
7 Named as defendants were Russell Oswald, then Commissioner of Correctional Services and Vincent Mancusi, Superintendent of Attica.
8477 F.2d at 1112.

9Id. at 1111. By statute, the Commissioner of Correctional Services is responsible for
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Judge Henderson, before whom the petition for a three-judge
court was presented, denied plaintiffs' motion. In a decision handed
down in June of 1972 he explained that plaintiffs' claims are based
upon two distinct theories.' 0 Primarily, "plaintiffs challenge the application of the regulations, which do not require the above-claimed
procedural safeguards, to any serious disciplinary proceeding in state
prisons."" Secondly, the plaintiffs challenged "the absence of these
safeguards when inmates are threatened, as are plaintiffs here, with
prison-disciplinary and subsequent criminal proceedings" since selfincrimination may be involved.12 Judge Henderson concluded that
neither theory necessitated the calling of a three-judge court. He explained that plaintiffs' constitutional claims under the first theory were
insubstantial in light of the Second Circuit's decision in Sostre v.
McGinnis'3 and that the plaintiffs' claims under the second theory
14
were only of local and not statewide concern.
Consequently, Judge Henderson, acting alone, heard the merits of
the case and ruled against the plaintiffs on all issues except as to
plaintiffs' right to counsel. 5 The plaintiffs appealed from both the
all matters relating to the government, discipline and policing of state correctional institutions and the inmates confined therein. He has the power to make rules and regulations
for the government and discipline of those facilities. N.Y. Comc. LAwv § 112 (McKinney
Supp. 1973). The commissioner is authorized to ". .. provide for such measures as he
may deem necessary for the safety, security and control of correctional facilities and the
maintenance of order therein." N.Y. CoRamc. LAW § 137 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
Under the regulations issued pursuant to statutory authority, if there is reasonable
cause to believe that an inmate's actions have constituted a danger to life, health, security
or property the superintendent of the institution may conduct a disciplinary proceeding.
Procedures for Implementing Standards of Inmate Behavior and for Granting Good Behavior Time Allowance 7 N.Y.C.R.R. ch. V., § 253.1. This proceeding is instituted by the
preparation of a formal charge by a prison employee. Id., § 253.2. The employee designated
to conduct the proceeding then must give a copy of the charge to the inmate and must
investigate any factual claim that the inmate might make. Id., § 253.3. At the commencement of the proceeding, the inmate must be advised of his right to be silent and must be
warned that any statements he makes might be used against him in a criminal proceeding.
The inmate is then interviewed and asked to either admit or deny the charge. If the inmate denies the charge or is silent, the presiding employee then must interview witnesses
or other persons who can contribute relevant information. Written reports are deemed part
of the record and may be considered without having them formally read into the record.
Before ruling on the charge, the presiding officer must reinterview the inmate, advise him
of the facts that tend to support the charge and give him the opportunity to comment or
make any statement with regard to the charge against him. Id., § 253.4.
10 The Second Circuit agreed with Judge Henderson that the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims were based upon two theories. 477 F.2d at 1112.
11 Id.
12 Id.

13 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
14477 F.2d at 1114. Judge Henderson viewed the matter as stemming from a specializad controversy, to wit, the Attica uprisings.
Is Id. at 1111. Judge Henderson granted the plaintiffs limited injunctive relief. He
required that plaintiffs be given the right to counsel at any part of the disciplinary pro-
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denial of their request for a three-judge court and from the grant of
only limited relief.16
The Second Circuit reversed the decision of the court below and
held that a three-judge district court was required.
7
Citing Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein1
the court
explained that in considering whether a given case should be heard
and determined by a three-judge court, a federal judge must decide if
a substantial constitutional issue is presented, if the complaint "at
least formally" states grounds for equitable relief, and if the case otherwise fits within the three-judge court legislation.' 8 In determining
ceedings which the inmates were allowed to attend and to be afforded an opportunity to
meet with counsel prior to any proceeding.
16 Id.

17 370 U.S. 713 (1962) (per curiam). The two main tests laid down in Idlewild were
whether the constitutional issue is substantial and whether there would be a proper basis
for the issuance of injunctive relief. Id. at 715. A denial of the application for a threejudge court based on the impropriety of equitable relief might rest on several grounds,
viz., that there was an adequate legal remedy, that administrative remedies provided by
the state had not been exhausted, or that, the abstention doctrine should be applied. Note,
The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure under Section 2281, 77 H Rv. L.REv.
299, 809 (1963). Professor Currie believes that it is an open question whether a single-judge
district court could consider such factors. Currie, supra note 1,at 25-26. The Second Circuit has ruled that only a three-judge court, not a single district judge, can consider
whether the federal courts should abstain from the case under the equitable and comity
principles enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971). Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds,
410 U.S. 951 (1973).
18477 F.2d at 1111-12. See Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125-26 (2d Cir. 1971).
vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968). The statute governing the operation of the
three-judge court requires that the district court judge who receives the application for
an injunction against enforcement of a state statute "immediately notify" the chief judge
of the circuit so that he might appoint two more members to the court. 28 U.S.C. § 2284
(1970).
Originally the Supreme Court held that district courts had no discretion and must
convene a three-judge court if the application on its face involved a constitutional question.
Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539, 545 (1911) (dictum). The Court stated:
We find no expression of or implication that there was an intention on the part
of Congress that the single justice or judge .. .need not call to his assistance
two other judges....
220 U.S. at 545.
Later the Court recognized that the statute only applied when a substantial constitutional question was raised. Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 15 (1930). If the
district court erred and failed to call a three-judge court when he should have, the
Supreme Court could issue a writ of mandamus directing the lower court to call the
special court. Id. at 16. However, the courts of appeals had no jurisdiction to review on
the merits a decision by a single district judge on a matter that would have warranted the
convening of a three-judge court and had no power to remand the case to the district
judge with a direction to convene the three-judge court. Id.
In recent years the Court has moved so far as to allow the courts of appeals to review
the determination of a single judge not to call the three-judge court. "Stratton does not
stand for the broad proposition that a court of appeals is powerless even to give any
guidance when a single judge has erroneously invaded the province of a three-judge court."
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these questions, the single judge may only look to the allegations contained in the complaint.' 9 Addressing itself to a consideration of the
first criterion, whether a substantial constitutional issue was present,
the Second Circuit stated that the issue presented may be clearly insubstantial because it is "obviously without merit" or because prior decisions so "foreclose the subject" as to prevent the question from being
a matter of controversy. 20 However, prior decisions, although in point,
do not necessarily preclude a substantial question.2 ' A claim is insubstantial only if a prior decision renders the claim frivolous. A doubtful
or questionable claim may be substantial enough to warrant the con22
vening of a three-judge court.
Thus, the initial question considered by the Second Circuit was
whether plaintiffs' claim was "foreclosed" by the court's earlier holding
in Sostre v. McGinnis. While Judge Henderson had found that the
Idlewild B]on Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715-16 (1962) (per curiam).
Therefore, the Court refused to issue a requested writ of mandamus. Id.
Just this year, the Court impliedly recognized that the court of appeals has jurisdiction
to determine if the single judge erred in refusing to call a three-judge court, but, citing
Stratton, ruled that a court of appeals could not reach the merits of the plaintiff's contentions. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 522 n.8 (1973). The court in Nieves apparently contradicted Goosby when it stated that the Second Circuit could affirm a single-judge district
court's decision "when we unhesitatingly agreed with the resolution of the merits of a case
by the court below, and where convening a statutory district court seemed therefore
patently wasteful." 477 F.2d at 1115. It is submitted that in light of Goosby a court of
appeals so acting would be doing so without subject matter jurisdiction. The proper
procedure in such a case would be to remand to a three-judge district court wherein a
motion for summary judgment might be entertained. Cf. Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121
(2d Cir. 1971).
19 Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 521 n.7 (1933); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933)
(per curiam).
20477 F.2d at 1112. See Ex parte Poresky, 290 US. 30, 32 (1933) (per curiam); Levering
& Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105-06 (1933).
21 Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 448 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1048 (1968).
22 Goosby v. Osser, 409 US. 512, 518 (1978); see Bailey v. Patterson, 869 U.S. 31, 33
(1962) (per curiam). In Bailey, the plaintiffs sought to enforce their right to nonsegregated
transportation, which was allegedly denied them under color of a state statute. The Court
ruled that prior decisions had rendered any claim by the state that the statute was constitutional frivolous. Id.
Cases such as Bailey may serve to eliminate the need for three-judge courts to hear
cases that are clearly noncontroversial. Currie, supra note 1 at 65-66. It is critical that some
weeding out be done because, ordinarily, the only review of a three-judge court decision is
in the Supreme Court, under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). Members of the Court already are
complaining of the heavy burden put upon them by the three-judge court legislation. See
41 U.S.L.W. 2094-95 (August 22, 1972) (Chief Justice Burger reported as favoring total
elimination of three-judge courts).
However, if a decision not to call a three-judge court is reversed on appeal, as in
Nieves, the litigants must commence proceedings all over again. Such a procedure could
result in considerable delay in resolving the case and considerable frustration of a state
policy or program. Currie, supranote 1, at 65-66.
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present allegations were "a mirror image" of those presented in Sostre,
the Second Circuit disagreed.23 In Sostre, the plaintiff argued that he
should not be punished by having to forfeit earned "good time" credit
or by losing the chance to earn such credit unless procedural safeguards
substantially the same as those alleged in Nieves were provided. 24 The
Sostre court rejected those claims, reversed a lower court's grant of
injunctive relief, and stated that:
All of the elements of due process recited by the district court are
not necessary to the constitutionality of every disciplinary action
25
taken against a prisoner.
In Nieves, the Second Circuit correctly noted that, unlike Sostre, the
plaintiff faced both disciplinary and criminal proceedings. 26 These
plaintiffs would be unable to speak in their own defense in the disciplinary proceeding for fear they might incriminate themselves. Any
incriminatory statement thus made could be used against them in the
subsequent criminal prosecution. Moreover, since the hearing denied
them the opportunity to call favorable witnesses and to cross-examine
unfavorable ones, the plaintiffs would be unable to present any defense
27
or explanation.
Secondly, Judge Feinberg noted that a reading of the Sostre
opinion also indicated that the court did not intend to settle the question of prisoners' rights once and for all. The Sostre court noted that in
most cases where substantial punishments were to be placed upon the
prisoner, due process would probably require that the prisoner be able
to confront his accusers, be informed of the evidence against him, and
be given a reasonable chance to explain his behavior.2 8 Thus, the plaintiffs in Nieves might be entitled to greater procedural protection be23477 F.2d at 1112.
24 The district court

ordered (and Sostre attempted to preserve the order on appeal)
that Sostre could not lose his "good time" credit unless he had: written notice of the
charges against him, a chance to confront adverse witnesses and present favorable ones, the
right to the assistance of counsel, and a recorded hearing before a disinterested official who
would issue a written decision. 442 F.2d at 195. These rights are similar to the ones asserted
by Nieves, set out in the text accompanying note 6 supra.
25 442 F.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
26 447 F.2d at 1113-14.
27Id. at 1114. It is conceivable that a Nieves plaintiff could be acquitted in the crim.
inal proceedings, but suffer disciplinary punishment because of his fear of speaking out in
his own defense.
28 442 F.2d at 198. The court further noted that:
We do not thereby imply that discipline in New York prisons may be administered
arbitrarily or capriciously. We would not lightly condone the absence of such basic
safeguards against arbitrariness as adequate notice, an opportunity for the prisoner
to reply to charges lodged against him, and a reasonable investigation into the
relevant facts at least in cases of substantial discipline.
442 F.2d at 203.
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cause they faced losing more than their "good time" credit. Relying
on these contentions2 9 the court concluded that the Nieves cause of
action was not inescapably foreclosed.8 0
The next consideration for the court was whether the challenged
statute was of "general and statewide application." 31 The Second Circuit ruled that the regulations did have sufficient statewide application.82 The regulations were based on a grant of authority by the state
legislature. Although the regulations would not affect every citizen of
the state nor every prisoner in state institutions, they were deemed

applicable to all state prisons. 3 The Second Circuit's reversal of the
district court on this point was vital to the protection of prisoners'
rights. Under the lower court's ruling, prisoners in state institutions
could not obtain federal injunctions against even the most arbitrary
actions of prison officials.84
The most interesting aspect of the Nieves decision stemmed from
the plaintiffs' attempted withdrawal, on appeal, of their request for
injunctive relief.85 This tactic was intended to induce the court of
29477 F.2d at 1113. The plaintiffs also claimed that their rights to cross-examination
and confrontation were more essential than Sostre's because the plaintiffs in Nieves would
be judged on the basis of testimony of adverse witnesses. The court expressed no opinion
as to the validity of this contention. Id.
8Old.
81 Moody v. Flowers, 887 U.S. 97, 101 (1967); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251
(1941); Rorick v. Board of Comm'rs, 307 U.S. 208, 212 (1939); Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S.
565, 568 (1928).
A three-judge court may not decide requests for injunctive relief against the enforcement of local ordinances because the Supreme Court has interpreted section 2281 as providing ". .. procedural protection against an improvident state-wide doom by a federal
court of a state's legislative policy." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154
(1963), quoting Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941).
But see 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), which provides for appeal as of right by a party relying on
a state statute held by a federal court of appeals to be unconstitutional. Although the
wording of section 1254(2) is similar to that of section 2281, the term "state statute" under
the former provision has been interpreted to include local ordinances. See, e.g., United Gas
Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 869 U.S. 134 (1962) (case involved a city license code).
82 477 F.2d at 1114. But see Board of Regents v. New Left Educ. Project, 404 U.S. 541,
544 (1972), where it was held that regulations applicable to only a few colleges and universities in Texas' system of higher education were not regulations of statewide concern.
83 477 F.2d at 1114. The court's decision is bolstered by viewing the regulations as
manifesting a state policy relating to the treatment of individuals confined in state penal
institutions.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the state in Nieves was willing to have a
single federal judge rule on the merits of the case. Id. at 1115. In view of the fact that the
state was the intended beneficiary of the three-judge court provisions, see note 1 supra,
the court considered it paradoxical to order the convening of the three-judge court for
the benefit of the plaintiffs. However, since Nieves satisfied the statutory requirements, the
court ordered the convening of the special court to avoid further litigation in the Supreme
Court because that would substantially delay a final resolution of the issue. Id. at 1115.
84 Id. The plaintiffs could of course attempt to obtain a federal declaratory judgment
or decide to vindicate their rights through the state court system.
8 Id.
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appeals to rule on the merits rather than remand to a three-judge district court. By withdrawing the prayer for injunction, the jurisdictional
basis for the three-judge court would dissolve and the jurisdiction of
the court of appeals would revive. 3 The court denied the motion,
ruling that it did not want the question of jurisdiction to be so easy to
manipulate.8 7 It was also necessary to remand the case because a limited
injunction had been granted, which the plaintiffs presumably did not
38
want to lose.
In Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of the Capitol Police,8 9 the
District of Columbia Circuit was faced with a similar problem. That
court also refused to give effect to the attempted withdrawal, though
on somewhat different grounds. The court in Jeannette reasoned that
the case retained the same character it started with, since the issuance
of a declaratory judgment by the court of appeals against the constitutionality of the statute involved would have a restraining effect similar
to an injunction. 40
Taken alone, Nieves presents a good discussion of the esoterica
involved in the complex area of three-judge district court litigation.
However, it is worthwhile to compare Nieves with another Second
Circuit case, Thorns v. Heffernan.41 The common thread running
through these two cases is that both recognize the Supreme Court's
legitimate concern with its growing caseload. Accordingly, both Thoms
42
and Nieves express dissatisfaction with the current statutory scheme.
In Thorns the Second Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's willingness
36A
three-judge district court is necessary only when an injunction is sought against a
state statute or administrative order. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). Appeals fTom single-judge
district court decisions are to the courts of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). Judge Henderson
had made a determination on the merits. By withdrawing their request for injunction, the
plaintiffs decided to try to waive the error of the lower court in refusing to call a threejudge court and to appeal the decision on the merits directly.
37477 F.2d at 1115.
88Id. at 1115-16. Judge Henderson was able to issue an injunction because his ruling
that no statewide policy was involved took the case out of section 2281.
If the motion to withdraw the request for injunctive relief had been granted, the
plaintiffs would have lost what limited relief they did receive. The denial of the motion
was without prejudice so that the plaintiffs could renew their motion to withdraw their
prayer for injunctive relief on remand and then bring another appeal. If they decided not
to renew their motion, Judge Henderson would then be required to convene a three-judge
court.
39 421 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1969), on remand, 342 F. Supp. 575 (D.D.C.), aff'd mere., 409
U.S. 972 (1972).
40 Id. at 1094.
41 473 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1973). See p. 377, for in-depth treatment of Thons.
42 In Thoins Judge Oakes stated "the anomalous situation we have here points up the
illogic of the present three-judge court statutes." 473 F.2d at 480. Judge Feinberg, who
wrote the opinion in Nieves commented "this litigation offers further proof, if such is
needed, of the need for modification or repeal of the three-judge court statutory scheme."
477 F.2d at 1111.
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to circumvent the three-judge court statutes by accepting a district
court decision which precluded direct review. In contrast, the Nieves
court followed the statute closely and ordered the special district court
convened even though an appeal from the three-judge court would
lie directly, as of right, to the Supreme Court.43 The distinction lies in
the inviolability of jurisdiction; in Thorns, the district court was permitted to influence the path of the litigation by the manner in which
relief was fashioned, while in Nieves, a party was not permitted to do
so. The lesson is clear: jurisdiction is a prerogative of courts, not
litigants.

DIscLosuRE OF GRAND JuRY TESTIMONY
In re Biaggi
The role of the grand jury in Anglo-American jurisprudence has
been the subject of recent controversy.1 The secrecy of grand jury
testimony has presented the courts with the complex choice of disclosing the minutes or adhering to the long established policy of
keeping grand jury testimony secret.2 Disclosure of grand jury minutes
43 477 F.2d 1109. Judge Feinberg stated:
Nevertheless, though adherence to the letter of section 2281 (and judicial gloss
thereon) may appear unduly formalized, and though it regrettably adds to the
growing Supreme Court caseload, it may also forestall further delay that results
from ultimately meaningless efforts, following disposition by a court of appeals, to
obtain Supreme Court review....

Id. at 1115.
1 Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972); Arrington v. United States, 350
F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Pa. 1972); People v. Talham, 41 App. Div. 2d 354, 342 N.Y.S.2d 921 (3d
Dep't 1973).
2 The custom of grand jury secrecy became fixed as a legal principle in England in 1681
in the Earl of Shaftesbury's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. (33 Chars. 2) 759 (1681), when jurors
refused to indict the Earl for "High Treason" although the charges had been asserted by
the King's Counsel. The jurors demanded, and obtained, the right to interview witnesses
in private, and, when they failed to indict, cited only their consciences as their reason for
declining to do so. For a historical perspective of grand jury secrecy see Calkins, The Fading
Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 18 (1967); Calkins, Grand Jury
Secrecy, 63 Micn. L. REv. 455 (1965); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The UnreasonableRule
of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. RPv. 668 (1962).
Even the Supreme Court has stated that the rule of secrecy is "indispensable." United
States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943). Courts consistently have stated the reasons for
which, in their opinion, secrecy exists. Although the attitudes and reasons behind the cloak
of secrecy are numerous and diverse, see Comment, The Discovery and Production of Grand
Jury Proceedings,19 MA. L Rv. 326 (1959), the following reasons most often have been
quoted:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused

